The argument here, then, is that far from ending domestic political contestation on the Left-Right axis, European integration and its concrete domestic manifestations in France are in fact subject to it.
Party Government and International Governance
The growing involvement of international fora (such as the G20), regimes, institutions, organizations or even regional quasi-polities (such as the European Union) in an increasing number of policy areas ranging from agriculture to defense is often thought to have contributed to the erosion of both the autonomy of the nation state and the traditional distinction between the political Left and Right. Recent research on France highlights both a course au centre amongst the mainstream parties and a growing belief amongst citizens that the differences between the Left and the Right are diminishing in part due to globalization and, more importantly, as a result of pursuing higher standards. The Working Time Directive is particularly important because it directly relates to the most salient issue dimension in French politics, namely the socio-economic domain. 16 A controversial piece of legislation, the directive pitted neo-liberals against the supporters of regulated capitalism. If parties matter, one would expect the handling of this issue in France-the country where the distinction between the Left and the Right was born-to vary as a function of the party in power. In addition, France's long-established system of labor inspectorates 17 could reasonably be expected to cope with the exigencies of a Directive that did not depart radically from French domestic policy. 18 Moreover, the regulation of working time has been a key policy area for governments of both the Left and the Right in parts of France) analysis shows that first, each political family's historically defined "prism" filters new challenges and leads to diverging attitudes and second, the change in government led to differences in the domestic pattern of implementation. This change is consistent with the partisan hypothesis: since parties rely on different référentiels and are located in different parts of the EU political space, their action reflects these differences in the context of the implementation of EU policy at the domestic level. To illustrate the point about partisan influence on the politics of implementation, it is important to demonstrate precisely how party behavior is linked to their respective référentiel. The next section draws on cleavage theory and outlines how these prisms come about.
Between the Party and the Nation? Political Contestation in the EU
Two dimensions define the structure of political contestation in the EU. 20 The vertical dimension relates to the issue of sovereignty: those who support deeper integration are distinguished from those who seek to preserve the nation state. The horizontal dimension reflects the conflict between the Left and the Right that remains an enduring organizing principle of political contestation in European states. 21 On issues of redistribution and the regulation of capitalism, parties of the Right aim to reduce taxes, government spending, regulation, and the role of the government in the economy while parties of the Left hold the belief that government should remain a significant actor in the economy. More broadly, unlike the Right, the Left supports intervention to promote equality and a more substantial conception of liberty.
Where are parties located in this structure of political contestation and why? In the study of European integration, national governments 22 and the "national interest"
were core features of theories derived from the study of international relations. Since
European integration is thought-from that perspective-to proceed on the basis of bargaining between national governments, the national location of a political party would be expected to determine its preferences. 
The Working Time Directive in France
Plus ça change?
The Directive is a complex piece of legislation, originally proposed in 1990 but adopted in amended form in 1993. While it explicitly stipulates that individual member states reserve the right to apply higher standards, it establishes compulsory minimum standards regarding the amount of time a worker can be required to work (forty-eight hours per week on average including overtime) and the amount of time a night worker can be required to work (an average of eight in twenty-four hours of work) coupled with record-keeping requirements regarding the regular use of night workers, a right for night workers 31 to receive free health assessments before their employment in night shifts and at regular intervals thereafter. In addition, it creates the right to eleven consecutive hours of rest per day and (when the working day is longer than six hours) the right to an in-work rest break, a weekly rest period of thirtyfive consecutive hours, a day off each week and four weeks' paid leave per annum.
The directive also offers the possibility of various derogations and exemptions, in part as concessions made in an effort to keep the Conservative British government "on board." The most important concession was the "opt-out" clause whereby member states have the right to introduce legislation that allows individual workers to exceed the forty-eight-hour limit. Other concessions include derogations (without compensation) from the provisions on daily and weekly rest periods, breaks, limits to work at night, the weekly work limit and the reference period used to calculate working hours for various groups, activities, and occupations (such as executives, family workers, and clergymen).
In short, the Working Time Directive sets minimum standards in some key areas, which are coupled with considerable scope for discretion in others and an emphasis on the involvement of the "social partners." 32 It deals with value-laden issues such as the autonomy of the market, the individual as a worker-economic unit or a multi-faceted human being, the autonomy of intermediary institutions, and the role of the state in the management of economic affairs. The directive also symbolizes an uneasy compromise between neo-liberals who oppose the intervention of public authorities in this area on grounds of efficiency, and the supporters of regulated capitalism, who support it because of its social considerations and its implications for employment, productivity 33 and health.
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The regulation of working time has been a major political issue for decades in The latter is mainly an issue of degree, rather than principle. Indeed, in 1982 the Socialists introduced legislation that allowed collective agreements reached at the sectoral or firm level to diverge from legislative provisions. 42 Until then, agreement at two levels, both sector and firm, was required. The trend towards further decentralization was subsequently enhanced by governments of the Left 43 but much more energetically by the Right. 44 However, the key difference remains unaltered: for the Left intervention is necessary to rectify the inequality between workers and their employers-a decision that is also linked to the weakness of trade unions in France.
The politics of transposition
Before the transposition of the Directive the weekly durée légale was thirty-nine hours in addition to up to 130 hours per annum of overtime while the daily working time limit was ten hours. 45 Nevertheless, collective agreements reached set different limits (between thirty-seven and forty-eight hours per week and up to twelve hours per day) with between seventy and 130 hours of overtime per annum, regulated rest breaks, and allowed the use of longer reference periods (up to a year) and compensatory rest for overtime worked. As regards weekly rest, there was a statutory limit of twenty-four hours that included Sunday. 46 Finally, there was a ban on night work for women. These arrangements differed from the provisions of the Directive in terms of night work, the absence of a statutory limit regarding daily rest and an eleven-hour difference in terms of weekly rest. However, the combined effect of the aforementioned provisions and those contained in collective agreements meant that-despite these legal differences, there was no major conflict between the French arrangements and the directive, 47 except in terms of night work. For example, given the limit 48 placed on overtime (130 hours), workers in France would not exceed fortytwo hours (on average) per week.
Although the directive had been proposed and negotiated while the Socialists were in power in France, it was formally adopted eights months after the Center- By the end of 2001 average weekly working time had been reduced to thirtysix hours 72 and approximately 300,000 jobs had been created, though the impact was greater in the firms that used the incentives offered by the laws than those that did not.
This trend was not focused on part-time jobs. Finally, the introduction of the new system reduced the pace of recourse to fixed-term jobs. 73 The reduction of working time and the concomitant creation of jobs were largely based on increased flexibility (in line with the options offered by the Working Time Directive) and wage restraint 74 both of which were accepted by the employees and their representatives in conjunction with the initiative taken by Socialist-led government of the Gauche plurielle. Flexibility took two forms: modulation 75 and further recourse to the calculation of working time on an annual basis ("annualization").
representatives accepted the combined recourse to these forms of flexibility only after the government had turned them into parts of a broader and more transparent trade-off that also involved reduced working time as well as job creation. Though this part of the trade-off can be said to have operated in the way foreseen by the government, increased flexibility also generated problems in some sectors of the economy, including the problem of non-payment of overtime due to the extension of the reference period to a year. 77 It thus enhanced-at least initially-the appeal of the In one of the first measures of the Raffarin government, François Fillon-then labor minister-left the durée légale intact but dramatically increased the overtime quota, 85 thus effectively raising weekly working time from thirty-five to thirty-nine hours 86 despite opposition from trade unions. This was a victory for the employers whose representatives had unsuccessfully sought to obtain the same result when the Increased autonomy for employers has been associated with problems regarding the flexible use of the workforce, particularly in sectors marked by lowskilled and often precarious jobs and low levels of trade union membershiplogistics, retail, cleaning, and security, for example. 93 Although the second Aubry law stipulated that changes could be made to an employee's work schedule only after a week's notice had been served, meeting this délai de prévenance remains problematic-despite the fact that the same principle was reiterated in 2008-as frequent and sudden changes are made to work schedules and employees (or their representatives) are not always consulted. 94 These problems in the aforementioned sectors are linked to the precarious nature of these jobs and the fact that low-skilled employees can be easily replaced. More importantly, the reversal of the hierarchy of norms has had a profound effect on the "ground" 95 where the task of labor inspectors has become much harder because facts have to be compared to a much more In addition to undermining the credibility of the law and-often-the workers' understanding of the rules that apply to them, complexity increases the importance of the operational autonomy and capacity of French labor inspectors.
Labor inspectors have seen their autonomy reduced indirectly as a result of the growing significance of firm-level agreements whose complexity (coupled with additional duties) increases the demands made on inspectors' limited time. 97 In addition, increasingly complex legal and, more often, sector-and firm-specific arrangements increase the demand for (and the importance of) the inspectors' advisory service. In addition, the reduction of support staff means that inspectors are compelled to deal with administrative matters to the detriment of their core function, which is to conduct inspections at the level of individual firms. 98 These developments undermine the inspectors' capacity to carry out their duties in the effective way that is required.
Although the promotion of flexibility was not its exclusive trait, the Right isolation from the other. In reality, EU policy is actually implemented not in a vacuum but in a specific socio-political milieu where ruling parties make consequential decisions and, potentially, a difference. There is evidence that the applicability of the partisan hypothesis is much broader than one might think.
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Instead of replacing one sweeping claim with another, we need detailed comparisons within and across sectors that will help paint a more nuanced and accurate picture of the conditions in which parties make a difference. This does not mean that these are totally coherent groups. Rather, it means that there is much more in common between them than they do with other parties in the same country. 29 Neither of these groups is completely homogenous. 
